Saturday, January 21, 2017
#Ethiopia is mentioned 6477 Times in recently released 13m declassified Documents of CIA
Click here to Read: declassified documents
Thursday, January 19, 2017
ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ የጋራ መኖርያ ቤቶችን በተመለከተ “የተሳሳተ” መረጃ አቅርበዋል
ዋዜማ ራዲዮ- ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ኃይለማርያም ደሳለኝ ባለፈው ሳምንት ለሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የመንግሥታቸውን ሥራ አፈጻጸም በተመለከተ ማብራሪያ መስጠታቸው ይታወሳል፡፡ በዚሁ ማብራሪያቸው በሕዝብ እንደራሴዎች ከተነሱላቸው ጥያቄዎች አንዱ የጋራ መኖርያ ቤት ግንባታን የተመለከተ ነበር፡፡ አብዛኛዎቹ የጋራ መኖርያ ቤቶች ‹‹ግንባታ ቆሟል›› የሚባል ወሬ እንዳለና የቤቶች ግንባታ በምን ሁኔታ ላይ እንደሚገኝ የተጠየቁት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ግንባታ ቆሟል የሚለውን ወሬ ማስተባበላቸው ይታወሳል፡፡
“ከብድር አቅርቦት መዘግየትና ከክረምቱ መግባት ጋር ተያይዞ” የተወሰነ መቀዛቀዝ እንደነበር ያመኑት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ በዚህ ዓመት 131ሺ ቤቶች ግንባታ ላይ እንደሚገኙ፣ ከነዚህ ዉስጥ 30ሺ የሚኾኑት በያዝነው ዓመት መጨረሻ ለነዋሪዎች እንደሚተላለፉ መናገራቸው ይታወሳል፡፡
ኾኖም ዋዜማ ከአዲስ አበባ ቤቶች ልማት አስተዳደር ፕሮጀክት ጽሕፈት ቤት ባገኘችው መረጃ በዚህ ዓመትም ኾነ በሚቀጥለው ዓመት ወደ ነዋሪዎች የሚተላለፍ አንድም የጋራ መኖርያ ቤት ይኖራል ተብሎ አይጠበቅም፡፡ ይህ ግን የ40/60 የጋራ መኖርያ ቤቶችን አያካትትም፡፡
እንደ ጽሕፈት ቤቱ ገለጻ መንግሥት ከገጠመው የገንዘብ ቀውስ ጋር ተያይዞ በዚህ ዓመት አንድም አዲስ የቤት ፕሮጀክት እንዳይጀመር መመሪያ የተላለፈው ከወራት በፊት ነው፡፡ ‹‹እስከዚያው እጃችን ላይ ያሉ ፕሮጀክቶችን እንጨርስ በሚል አቅጣጫ ተቀምጦ እየተሰራ ነበር›› የሚሉት የጽሕፈት ቤቱ ባልደረባ ኾኖም አሁን ግንባታ ላይ ያሉ ፕሮጀክቶችን ራሱ ለማስፈጸም የሚያስችል የገንዘብ አቅም እንደሌለ ተረድተናል ይላሉ፡፡
ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ለሕዝብ እንደራሴዎች በዚህ ዓመት መጨረሻ 30ሺ ቤቶች ለነዋሪዎች ይተላለፋሉ ማለታቸውን በተመለከተ እንደማንኛውም ሰው ጉዳዩን በሚዲያ እንደሰሙ የገለጹት ይኸው የቤቶች ልማት ጽሕፈት ቤት ባልደረባ “በእርግጠኝነት ነው የምነግርሽ ለዚህ ዓመት የሚደርስ አንድም ቤት አይኖርም፤ ቢኾን እኮ እኛም ደስ ይለናል” ሲሉ አስረግጠው ተናግረዋል፡፡ “ምናልባት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ያን ያሉት ለፖለቲካ ፍጆታ ወይም ሕዝቡ ተስፋ እንዳይቆርጥ” በሚል ሊኾን እንደሚችል ይገምታሉ፡፡
ቀጣዩ 12ኛ ዙር የጋራ መኖርያ ቤቶች እጣ በዚህ ዓመት መጨረሻ ካልሆነ መቼ ሊሆን ይችላል ተብለው የተጠየቁት የጽሕፈት ቤቱ ባልደረባ፣ “አሁን ግንባታ ላይ ያሉት የ20/80 ቤቶች ገና በጅምር ላይ ናቸው፣ 35 በመቶ የደረሱት እንኳ ጥቂት ናቸው፣ እንደኔ ግምት በ2010 መጨረሻ ሐምሌ አካባቢ ጥቂት ቤቶች ሊደርሱልን ይችላሉ›› ካሉ በኋላ ‹‹በተጨባጭ እናውራ ካልን በ2011 የመጀመርያ ነባር ተመዝጋቢዎችን ፍላጎት አሟልተን እንጨርሳለን›› ሲሉ ቀጣዩን ዙር በ2 ዓመት ይገፉታል፡፡ ሲያጠቃልሉም “…እንዴትም ቢሠራ የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩን ቃል መጠበቅ አይቻልም፣” ብለዋል፡፡ የቤቶቹን ብዛት በተመለከተም ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ እንዳሉት 30ሺ ቤቶች ሳይኾን 26ሺ ቤቶች ብቻ ናቸው ለ12ኛ ዙር በግንባታ ሂደት ላይ ያሉት፡፡ እነዚህም የ20/80 መርሀግብር ቤቶች ናቸው፡፡
የጽሕፈት ቤቱ ባለሞያ ጨምረው እንደሚሉት ከነዚህ የ20/80 ቤቶች ይልቅ አሁን በጥሩ የግንባታ ሂደት ላይ የሚገኙት የ40/60 ፕሮጀክቶች እንደሆኑና ከእነዚህ ዉስጥ 20ሺህ የሚኾኑት ምናልባት በ2010 መጨረሻ ዕጣ ሊወጣባቸው እንደሚችል የመሥሪያ ቤታቸውን የድርጊት መርሀ ግብር ሰሌዳ አመሳክረው ተናግረዋል፡፡ አያይዘውም በንግድ ባንክ በኩል እንዲተላለፉ የተወሰኑ የ40/60 መርሐግብር የመጀመርያ ዙር ዕጣ በየካቲት መጨረሻ አልያም በመጋቢት መጀመርያ ሊወጣ እንደሚችል፣ ዝግጅቱና ሰነድ ርክክቡ ከሞላ ጎደል መጠናቀቁን እንደሚያውቁ አብራርተዋል፡፡ እነዚህ ቤቶች ግን በቁጥር 1ሺህ 292 ብቻ ናቸው፡፡
መንግሥት ከሕዝብ በሚደርስበት ጫና የተነሳ የቤቶች ግንባታ እንዲፋጠን ከፍተኛ ፍላጎት አለው የሚሉት ባለሞያው ይህን ተከትሎም እኛ ላይ ግፊቱ እየበረታ መጥቷል ይላሉ፡፡ ኾኖም ከቅርብ ጊዜ ወዲህ ‹‹በቂ የገንዘብ አቅርቦት›› እየደረሰን አይደለም፤ ከንግድ ባንክ ጋር በብደር አሰጣጥ ዙርያ አለመግባባቶች አሉ፤ የበጀት እጥረትና ከብረት ግዢ ጋር ተያይዞ ያላግባቡን ነገሮች አሉ ሲሉም የመዘግየቱን ምክንያት ይተነትናሉ፡፡ በአንጻሩ በመሬት አቅርቦት ረገድ ችግር እንደሌለና ኾኖም ከበጀትና ተያያዥ ጉዳዮች የተነሳ ከቅርብ ጊዜ ወዲህ ሂደቱ አዝጋሚ እየሆነ መምጣቱን አልሸሸጉም፡፡
የ40/60 ቤቶች ተቋራጮች ካለፈው ዓመት መጨረሻ ጀምሮ ከክፍያ መዘግየት ጋር ተያይዞ ሥራ ማቆማቸው ይታወሳል፡፡ ኾኖም ባለፈው ወር መጠነኛ ገንዘብ በመለቀቁ አንዳንድ ሳይቶች ላይ ግንባታዎች በከፊል ማንሰራራት ጀምረዋል፡፡ ከዚህ ዓመት መባቻ በፊት በአያት፣ በሲኤምሲ፣ በብርጭቆ ፋብሪካ፣ በመገናኛ 24፣ በቡልቡላና በገርጂ ፈጣን የግንባታ እንቅስቃሴ ይታይ እንደነበረና የአንዳንዶቹ አፈጻጸም እንዲያውም ከእቅድ በላይ እንደነበር ይታወሳል፡፡ ኾኖም የቤቶቹ ቁጥር ከተመዝጋቢዎቹ ጋር በጭራሽ የሚመጣጠን አይደለም፡፡
በ40/60 መርሀ ግብር 150ሺ የሚጠጉ ተመዝጋቢዎች በቁጠባ ላይ ናቸው፡፡ እነዚህ ዜጎች ሙሉ በሙሉ ቤታቸውን ለማግኘት ከዚህ በኋላ በትንሹ ስድስት ዓመታትን መጠበቅ ሊኖርባቸው ይችላል፤ እንደ ጽሕፈት ቤቱ ባለሞያ ግምት፡፡
Monday, January 16, 2017
Sunday, January 15, 2017
Wednesday, January 11, 2017
Monday, January 9, 2017
Overcoming the Current State of Interregnum and Making Political Convergence a Possibility By Abdissa Zerai (PhD
In my previous piece, Ethiopia in a State of Interregnum, I have attempted to explain the current political crisis and the attendant condition of uncertainty in Ethiopia through a theoretical lens of interregnum as articulated by Gramsci. After the publication of the article on Ethiomedia and other sites, I have received emails from various individuals asking if I could also say something with respect to how to overcome the interregnum I have talked about. In this piece, I attempt to address the issue as I see it.
In the previous piece, I referred to Gramsci and defined interregnum as a situation in which the old ways of doing things do not work any longer, but new ways of doing things have not yet been designed and put in place. And in the meantime, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. Connecting the concept of interregnum with the current Ethiopian political condition, I also argued:
…the politico-economic order the EPRDF put in place following the demise of the military junta seems to have reached a point where it has lost its traction. As the continued popular protests and skirmishes indicate, citizens appear to have lost faith in the system and are unwilling to be governed in the old ways anymore. They are demanding fundamental change that is compatible with the exigencies of the time. On the other hand, a new frame that can effectively replace the dying structure has not yet been designed. As a result, in this time of great uncertainty and decomposition of life, we are observing the emergence of a great variety of morbid symptoms from different directions.
As an example of the emergence of such morbid symptoms, I have summarized some apparently confusing and often contradictory diagnoses of and prescriptions for our current political debacle offered by the various Ethiopian political forces, and how such disparate positions are making political convergence a daunting task. In this piece, I offer my perspective with respect to overcoming the condition of interregnum and thereby making political convergence a possibility.
What is the way out of the current predicament? Except on the issue of the imperative of instituting a genuinely democratic order- a point on which there is unanimity, different political forces give different responses to the question based on their respective positions on the place of identity politics in a democratic political setting. Based on such positions, the Ethiopian political forces could broadly be classified into three categories: a) those who decry anything ethnic; b) those who regard ethnicity as a panacea; and c) those who see accommodating ethnicity as a pragmatic way forward.
Those who decry ethnic-based political mobilization argue that group-based politics is structurally exclusivist and antithetical to democracy, which is often assumed to be normatively inclusive. They stress that group-differentiated politics of difference destroys the common good around which the political participation of all ought to be structured. They further note that an identity-based, group-differentiated politics endangers national identity, which ought to be the primary focus of political debate, and undermines solidarity among citizens and freezes different groups in opposition to one another. Hence, they dismiss the validity of taking ethnicity as an organizing principle for conducting democratic politics; instead, they advocate for pursuing civic-oriented politics as a viable way forward.
Those in the second category tend to evoke the colonial thesis and argue that their ethnic group had suffered internal colonization enduring systematic dispossession, exploitation and marginalization at the hands of the Abyssinian elites. They see the current political system as nothing but the continuation of the internal colonization of their group by the Abyssinian elites. The only difference this time, the argument goes, is who is in the driver’s seat, i.e., the Tigrayan elites have succeeded the hitherto dominant Amhara elites, and has substantively continued along a similar path. The only way out of such enduring cycle of internal colonization is the exercise of the right to ethnic self-determination that would guarantee their ethnic group to be the master of its own destiny. The third position seems to have emanated from the recognition of our checkered history, particularly with reference to ethnic relations, and from taking into account the objective reality that currently exists on the ground. And this is the position I would like to expound on in the subsequent section for I believe that it provides a better chance for minimizing the current political polarization and thereby making convergence among the disparate political forces a possibility.
My argument to this end is guided by the imperative of facing the world as it is instead of the world as it ought to be. In order to make my point clear, let me recall a brief story here: Sometime in December 2004, the then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was leading a morale-boosting town hall discussion with Iraq-bound troops. But he was caught off guard when all of a sudden an Army Specialist Thomas Wilson fielded a pointed question complaining about vehicles that lacked armor protection against roadside bombs. Rumsfeld’s response was: “You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” It is tempting to characterize Rumsfeld’s response as callous. But it was not callousness at all; rather, it was the realization of the fact that they were in the middle of a war and that that was the equipment available at the moment and, hence, the troops should make the best of the conditions they faced while the Pentagon would push manufacturers of vehicle armor to produce it as fast as humanly possible. My argument for the accommodation of ethnicity in our political debate is, therefore, predicated on the realization of the conditions on the ground and on the belief that we should not allow the best to be the enemy of the good. Among the inescapable objective realities that currently stare into our eyes are our checkered history, which unfortunately we have not yet been able to shake off, and the current reality on the ground.
First, I would like to provide a brief overview of our checkered history with particular focus on ethnic relations. Unless a victim of historical amnesia, one does not need to be a celebrated historian to understand the fact that the political history of modern Ethiopia has been an unflattering one punctuated by asymmetrical relations of power among its constituent ethnic groups. As had been the case with the trajectory of building empires, the Ethiopian empire had been forged largely by the exercise of brute force. And later on when the concept of nation-state became a nodal point in the political science lexicon, successful nation-state building was seen as predicated on cultivating the adoption of one national language, one national religion, one national culture, and one national way of being. This necessitated the onset of the specter of forced or involuntary assimilations into a privileged way of being, where such a privileged way of life and cultural expression essentially became Abyssinian in general and Amhara-centric in particular. In the process, Amharic was imposed as an official language; Orthodox Christianity assumed the status of state religion and the normative standard against which the worth of any religious doctrine and/or practice was to be measured; important cultural signifying features such as music, clothing, food, etc., were also allowed to correspondingly originate from the same spring. Such a process unleashed both symbolic and epistemic violence against the marginalized ethnic Others. According to Pierre Bourdieu (1998b), when a holder of symbolic capital uses the power this confers against an agent who holds less, and seeks thereby to influence or alter the agent’s actions, he/she exercises symbolic violence. From Bourdieu’s (1998b) perspective, symbolic violence is fundamentally the imposition of categories of thought and perception upon dominated social agents. On the other hand, epistemic violence, as posited by Spivak (1988), occurs when the dominant group uses its position to marginalize the voices of the dominated group.
Due to such historical coincidence, therefore, what had once been particular now became ‘universal’; what had once been cultural and historically contingent now appeared natural and taken-for-granted. Such a phenomenon in turn contributed to the creation of status hierarchy in the social milieu. It could, thus, be argued that for the members of the disparate Ethiopian ethnic communities who were on the margin, their encounter with the dominant social institutions was a traumatizing experience that constantly reminded them of their ‘Otherness’. Their struggle to fit in, to catch up and to measure up was often betrayed, among other things, by the inevitability of having to recognize the incompatibility of their life experiences with what they encountered, the reality of having to deal with one’s broken Amharic or speaking it with a heavy accent or the difficulty of expressing oneself with ease and the feeling of humiliation, low self-esteem, self-inadequacy and the resultant sense of anger associated with having to project in public an image of an infant in an adult body. What is more, apart from the damage it inflicted at the psychological and sociological levels, the phenomenon had implications for the material wellbeing of the subaltern communities as the objective conditions structurally constrained their access to opportunities in comparison to those from the dominant group. And the fact that we have not yet been able to fully recover from its debilitating impact tells us how costly our nation-state building project had been. When Ato Lencho Bati, who is one of the leaders of the Oromo Democratic Front (ODF), said (at one of the D.C. forums organized by ESAT sometime in 2016) that the Ethiopian state has been a cultural state and not a civic state, he was essentially referring to the same phenomenon I am trying to explicate here. For Ato Lencho and the Oromos he hails from and other historically marginalized ethnic groups, the images often projected by the Ethiopian state had little to do with them as these images did not provide a point of reference they could identify with.
This being the case, however, courage, intellectual honesty and, more importantly, empathy have eluded most of our intellectuals in general and some Amhara elites in particular in taking stock of the sad trajectory of our history and the unflattering relations between the various ethnic groups that constituted the Ethiopian state. The often retorted argument is that all Ethiopian ethnic groups suffered oppression and exploitation at the hands of the ruling class and there was no special privilege bestowed upon the Amhara ethnic group by virtue of the ruling elite traditionally being largely from the same group. However, the reality is more nuanced than that; it is true that oppression and exploitation were across the board. But creating moral equivalence between the oppression and exploitation of the Amhara masses on the one hand and the rest of marginalized ethnic groups on the other is a serious mistake as the capital the two groups possessed was glaringly unequal. According to Bourdieu (1998a), the structure of objective relations between social agents defines what they can and cannot do. In order to describe the power possessed by agents, Bourdieu (1998a) uses the concept of capital, of which he distinguishes four types: economic (money), cultural (skills, abilities, knowledge, etc.), social (networks), and symbolic (prestige, reputation). The relative degree of the possession of these different forms of capital determines the social agent’s chances of success.
The American academic and political discourse, for example, is often replete with the notion of white privilege. But this does not necessarily mean that all white Americans are rich, educated, healthy, powerful, etc. There are dirt-poor, uneducated and disenfranchised white Americans as there are African Americans and other minorities. What it means is that the mere fact that they are whites gives them societal privileges that benefit them beyond what is commonly experienced by non-white Americans under the same social, political, or economic circumstances. And such disparity in the possession of this important capital makes a huge difference in an individual agent’s or a group’s relative chance of success and social standing.
Applying the same logic, an economically poor Amhara could, for example, have a better cultural, social and symbolic capital at his/her disposal than one from a marginalized ethnic group who might even have an economic capital at his/her disposal. Similarly, a poor and uneducated Amhara could have a far better social and symbolic capital than his/her counterpart who might have happened to be from a minority group, and we can go on and on.
The protracted struggle waged for inclusion, recognition, dignity and national self-determination was largely born out of the realization of and the desire to reverse such injustices perpetrated against the various constituent ethnic groups in the name of nation building. This struggle has still continued to date. The need to accommodate ethnic-based organizations as a pragmatic solution comes against the backdrop of our checkered history and the collective struggle the various groups pursue in order to correct its deleterious effects
This struggle first led to the overthrow of the monarchy that had presided over ‘the prison house’ of nationalities and set a stage for the subsequent takeover of the Ethiopian state by a military junta. Although the military junta tried to bring about some changes, for various factors it failed to effectively address the ‘national’ question and transform the Ethiopian state in a new progressive direction. Ostensibly for the very similar reasons identified above, the TPLF fought the Marxist military junta tooth and nail and removed it forcefully in 1991. Soon after controlling the lever of power, the TPLF-led EPRDF gave ethnicity a central place in structuring the Ethiopian political sphere. It went as far as constitutionally guaranteeing ethnic self-determination up to cessation. It adopted a federal structure organized largely along ethno-linguistic cleavages. After more than twenty-five years of experimentation, however, our problems have become even more intractable and are posing an existential threat to the integrity of the Ethiopian state.
The political forces who decry anything ethnic cite the current crisis as a further indictment of ethnic politics and calls for the cleansing of our body politic from identity-based political mobilization. Indeed there are numerous social theorists, political scientists and philosophers that argue that ethnic-based politics can pose a threat to the survival of democratic political order. Such arguments are often advanced through the lens of ethnic outbidding theory. On the other hand, there are scholars who see the nature of institutions as a more important determinant than the presence or absence of identity politics. In fact they argue that in an ethnically divided society, institutional engineering offers the least unfavorable prospects for peaceful democratic order. According to professor Kanchan Chandra (2005), for instance, ethnic parties can sustain a democracy depending on the institutional context within which ethnic divisions are politicized. Chandra (2005) further asserts that institutions that artificially restrict ethnic politics to a single dimension are likely to destabilize democracy, whereas institutions that foster the politicization of multiple dimensions of ethnic identity are likely to sustain it. Professor Chandra’s (2005) claim rests on a revision of the outbidding models’ assumptions about ethnic identity. According to Chandra (2005), these models are based on the now discredited “primordialist” assumptions that ethnic identities are fixed, unidimensional, and exogenous to politics. But Chandra (2005) discards these assumptions in favor of the “constructivist” position that ethnic identities can be fluid, multidimensional, and endogenous to competitive politics. These new assumptions reveal an unexpected and positive relationship between the institutionalization of ethnic divisions and democratic stability.
As is known, India meets the classic definition of an ethnically divided society where such a division often goes along the lines of language, tribe, caste, region, and religion. And parties based on these divisions have often emerged in Indian politics. As argued by Chandra (2005), while these parties have often engaged in an initial spiral of outbidding, however, this has typically given way, over a longer stretch of time, to centrist behavior. According to Chandra (2005), the roots of this pattern lie, paradoxically, in the institutional encouragement of ethnic politics by the Indian state. The scholar goes on to argue that acting on the inherent multidimensionality of ethnic identities, such encouragement forces initially extremist parties toward the center. As a case in point, Chandra (2005) identifies the ethnic party behavior in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh and the mechanism by which institutionalization produces centrism in ethnic party behavior. Notwithstanding various scholars’ misgivings about the potential deleterious effects of ethnic-based politics, I think that professor Chandra’s insights cannot be dismissed off hand, as these insights might have some relevance in explaining the current political crisis in Ethiopia. In this respect, it can be argued that the crisis in our body politic has more to do with the way ethnic politics has been institutionalized than something necessarily inherent to ethnicity. In other words, the behavior of ethnic party politics is largely shaped by the way it is institutionalized.
In order to make the point of my argument more accessible, I would like to turn to an old Cherokee tale of two wolves: One evening an old Cherokee Indian told his grandson about a battle that goes on inside people. He said, ‘My son, the battle is between two ‘wolves’ inside us all. One is Evil. It is anger, envy, jealousy, sorrow, regret, greed, arrogance, self-pity, guilt, resentment, inferiority, lies, false pride, superiority, and ego. The other is good. It is joy, peace, love, hope, serenity, humility, kindness, benevolence, empathy, generosity, truth, compassion and faith.’ The grandson thought about it for a minute and then asked his grandfather: ‘Which wolf wins?’ The old Cherokee simply replied, ‘The one you feed.’
The moral of the tale is that each and every one of us has these two wolves running around inside us. The Evil wolf or the Good wolf is fed daily by the choices we make with our thoughts. What one thinks about and dwells upon will in a sense appear in his/her life and influence his/her behavior. As individuals, groups, organizations, and society, we have a choice: feed the Good wolf and it will show up in our character, habits and behavior positively, or feed the Evil wolf and our whole world will turn negative like poison and will slowly eat away at our soul. In the same token, both the Good wolf and the Evil wolf inhabit what we call ‘ethnicity.’ This means that ‘ethnicity’ has the potential to produce good or bad fruits. But which of the two it produces at a given time depends on whether we feed the aspect of it that would bring the good fruit or one that would bring the bad fruit.
In light of this insight, we can reexamine the institutionalization of ethnic politics in the Ethiopian context. In the new political dispensation, difference based on the primordial conceptualization of ethnicity has constitutionally been codified to singularly regulate access to power and resources. Of the various markers of one’s identity (such as occupation, class, gender, age, region, religion, etc.), ethnicity is picked and given political and institutional recognition and legitimation as the uncontested identity marker that determines the fate of citizens. The rigidity of the way this identity marker has been used or abused in the last two decades can easily be seen in the way millions of ethnic ‘mestizos’ (people from mixed ethnic groups) have been denied a category that could rightly accommodate them; instead, they have been forced to choose between one of their parents’ ethnic label. Even after the forced identification, they knew that members of the ethnic group they chose to identify with would not see them as authentic members of their ethnic group. The Darwinian struggle for access to power and resources has essentially eclipsed any other forms of grouping, and has sharply accentuated difference and exacerbated tensions among the society. Since there is no incentive in terms of access to power and resources for those who might wish to organize themselves on the basis of cross-cutting cleavages, by default more and more people have turned to ethnic-based cleavages. In the process, civic or pan-Ethiopian identity has suffered a collateral damage.
If what institutionally regulates access to power and resources were made to depend on multidimensional identity markers rather than on ethnic cleavage alone, ethnic differences would not have been as accentuated as they are now. Unfortunately, the institutional choice the system made has invariably fed the ‘Evil wolf’ and thereby brought the worst in us. A step to reversing such damaging consequences does not lie on bashing anything ethnic and waving the ‘unity flag’ as a panacea. Rather, it depends on a careful analysis of the world as it is and designing a workable strategy to get to the world as it ought to be. Hence, it is important to recognize that ethnic politics is not going to go away anytime soon; believing otherwise would be a wishful thinking. As long as they are committed to the integrity of the Ethiopian state and a genuinely democratic political order, ethnic-based political organizations ought to be embraced and political forces should be open to working with them and minimizing the existing deficit of trust and confidence. At this moment, that is the viable path to achieving political convergence, without which nothing meaningful could come about. When such convergence happens, even those on the extreme wing who might have entertained the ‘Buthelezi syndrome’ could come to their senses and moderate their demands.
As the recent trend shows, however, the cyberspace is replete with self-defeating bravado, jingoism, and ad hominem that is poisoning sane political debate, and it is important to contain outbursts and focus on releasing positive energy. Having said that, I would like to conclude this piece with a brief story once told by Reverend Billy Graham (1978). It goes like this: “An Eskimo Fisherman” came to town every Saturday afternoon. He always brought his two dogs with him. One was white and the other was black. He had taught them to fight on command. Every Saturday afternoon in the town square the people would gather and these two dogs would fight and the fisherman would take bets. On one Saturday the black dog would win; another Saturday, the white dog would win – but the fisherman always won! His friends began to ask him how he did it. He said, “I starve one and feed the other. The one I feed always wins because he is stronger.”
In the final analysis, the political forces would have to either choose to see the world as it is and work with what they have to achieve convergence, or decide to keep on in-fighting and bickering among themselves until ‘kingdom comes.’ If they choose the latter, one thing will be certain: ‘the Eskimo Fisherman will keep winning.’
The author is the former dean of the school of journalism and communication at Addis Ababa University and can be reached at: berhanwota@gmail.com
Saturday, January 7, 2017
Ethiopia’s political troubles are going to test its beneficial China relationship
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Nearly three months into the state of emergency declared by Ethiopia, the atmosphere on the streets of its bustling and impressively modern metropolis and capital, Addis Ababa, feels tense.
At 2,355m above sea level, the climate is pleasantly mild most of the year. Its broad thoroughfares are studded with magnificent cultural attractions. These are infused with the glow of an ancient yet resilient civilisation that could withstand both Jesuit and Wahhabi encroachment.
Yet, at present, tourists are understandably few and far between. There have been reports of hundreds of deaths in districts surrounding the capital in recent weeks. But these have been played down as an exaggeration by Prime Minister Heilemariam Desalegn.
Violence broke out during an Oromo religious festival, and in some instances foreigners seem to have been targeted. In response, the predominantly ethnic-Tigrean government clamped down on social media, took a few TV channels off the air, and restricted the movement of the opposition leader and foreign observers.
For the past few years, Ethiopia has been able to partly shed its association with abject poverty and famine. Arguably inspired by China, the country became a developmental success story and one of the fastest-growing countries in the world. At much the same time, Addis Ababa was able to capitalise on being the gateway to the politics of the African continent and foreign aid.
It is evident just how rapidly China’s stakes here have grown over the past few years. Just as evident is China’s different approach to development as compared with the West. It is also easy to see why the recent instability in Ethiopia is a real test to China’s approach.
Behind the veneer of Ethiopia’s parliamentary federalism lies an authoritarian system of state-led development that is preferred by Beijing over the country’s ragtag opposition forces. The question is whether the fruits of fast economic growth can be distributed sufficiently effectively in Ethiopia so as to forestall ethnic rural unrest.
Showcase infrastructural projects
Rather than providing grants directly aimed at poverty alleviation or promoting civil society, Chinese state-owned enterprises have been busy erecting showcase infrastructural projects. The aim is to attract further private business investment and to boost tourism.
The new sparkling African Union conference centre in Addis was fully funded by China. A new six-lane 87km highway to Adama has cut travel time from three hours to just one hour. And the international arm of China State Construction will soon give the capital a state-of-the-art stadium and upgrade its airport.
But perhaps a more persuasive productivity-booster is Addis Ababa’s new light-rail network completed in 2015 by China Railway Engineering Corporation. Often, the Chinese developmental approach is portrayed as construction frenzy ahead of genuine consumer demand.
Yet, far from being at risk of becoming a white elephant, it is already heavily used by local commuters just over a year after inauguration. In a city where taxi fares are exorbitant and buses are often in bad repair, the network is making a real difference to ordinary people’s lives.
But Beijing also runs a real risk here. In 2007, for example, 65 Ethiopians and nine Chinese expatriates were murdered by Somali separatists in an attack on a Sinopec-run oilfield in the east of the country. There is clearly a strong case for Heilemariam to broaden his government’s ethnic support base and heed various regional and rural concerns about disenfranchisement as a result of foreign investment.
No zero-sum game between the US and China
Unlike the Chinese Foreign Affairs ministry, the US State Department has expressed concern over the imposition of the state of emergency.
But the Ethiopian government is likely to remain in the US’s good books. This is primarily because of its role in countering the spread of fundamentalist terrorism in the Horn of Africa. In fact, it is that role that has helped endear Ethiopia to the world, and facilitated Western relief aid.
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to conclude China’s growing stakes in Ethiopia immediately offset Western interests. For one thing, Ethiopia’s recent troubled history suggests the enemies of government often denounce oppression. But they do not necessarily champion human rights when they seize power themselves.
In addition, Western aid is still far greater and more vital to the running of the country than anything China provides. For all the speculation about the Chinese currency replacing the US dollar as global reserve currency soon, most hotels here do not seem to readily exchange China’s currency for Birr yet.
There is, in short, no zero-sum game between the US and China over Ethiopia, at times quite to the contrary. Neither power is interested in Ethiopia purely for exploitative colonial-style mineral extraction, or is purely motivated by altruism. The budding, somewhat desultory Chinatown in Addis Ababa’s Rwanda Vegetable Market hardly comes across as an insular colonial outpost. And the Chinese embassy compound is vastly outsized by the American one.
What plays out instead are perhaps different approaches to the low-income world where the US has prized the diffusion of individual freedoms and human-rights norms and China has prized collective economic betterment. And both the US and China are set to lose out if chaos spreads in the Horn of Africa.
China’s approach may be benefiting Ethiopia
Amid capital scarcity, China’s different approach seems to benefit Ethiopia. Put simply, it opens up another avenue for development where the World Bank and IMF doctrines have until recently been the only show in town.
In concrete terms, it means Chinese companies nowadays bid for projects often with concessional terms – where, in the past, only Western companies had the technological capacity to deliver.
Hydro-electricity is perhaps the best example for that: a healthy competition seems to be building up between Italy’s Salini Impregilo and Sinohydro when it comes to damming Ethiopia’s rivers. Local and foreign NGO oversight would still be vital in order to minimise the dislocation and environmental degradation that both companies can cause.
But, at the same time, with better planning, the untapped potential of hydro-power might mean cleaner and lower-cost energy in a part of the world where power cuts are all too common.
Friday, January 6, 2017
Ethiopia: Up to 70,000 detained in Oromo region alone
ESAT News (January 5, 2017)
The Ethiopian regime announced on Wednesday that it has released 10,000 prisoners in the Oromo region but local opposition political party says up to 70,000 people still remain in jail.
Mulatu Gemechu of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress told the Associated Press that an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 people have been detained in the Oromo region in recent months.
He says prisons are full and some people are now being held at private residences.
The regime declared a state of emergency early in October following a yearlong anti-government protests mainly in the Oromo and Amhara regions where at least 1,500 people were shot and killed by security forces.
Source: http://ethsat.com/2017/01/ethiopia-70000-detained-oromo-region-alone/
Ethiopia: Eight soldiers killed in a fight with guerilla groups
ESAT News (January 6, 2017)
Eight regime soldiers have reportedly been killed in a fight with guerrilla groups operating in western Ethiopia.
A human rights activist for the Benishangul Gumuz region of Ethiopia, Halid Nassir confirmed to ESAT the ongoing fight between regime forces and guerrilla groups operating in the area.
Nassir said 12 people have been detained following the fight on Thursday and Friday. He also said security forces have been arresting and taking several people to Assosa in the last few days. Nassir said over 1000 people have been detained without due process of law.
The Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement claims a total of 51 regime soldiers have been killed in recent fights. Head of the Movement Abdulahi Aladih said civilians have also been killed in the recent fights but did not say how many.
The Ethiopian regime is facing armed resistance in all directions. There have been reports of fighting in northern Ethiopia where both the government and guerilla fighters claiming to have the upper hand.
Source: http://ethsat.com/2017/01/ethiopia-eight-soldiers-killed-fight-guerilla-groups/
Tuesday, January 3, 2017
NEWS: ETHIOPIA FEDERAL COURT JAILED KEDIR MOAHMMED YUSUF ET.AL TO FIVE YEARS & SIX MONTHS
Journalist Darsema Sori Banqash is sentenced to four years and five months as he is suffering from tuberculosis; four of the 20 are among the 38 inmates facing a separate charge suspected of burning Qilinto prison
Mahlet Fasil
Addis Abeba Jan. 03/2017– The federal High Court 19th criminal bench has today sentenced19 defendants under the file name of the first defendant Kedir Moahmmed Yusuf to five years a six months each while one defendant in the same file was sentenced to four years and five months. On Dec. 21 2016 the federal court found all the 20 defendants guilty of terrorism related charges and violating the country’s penal code.
Two of the accused: Kalid Mohammed Ahmed, 26, and Darsema Sori Banqash, 48, are journalists at Radio Bilal. Darsema Sori Banqash is the one who is sentenced to four years and five months because he is suffering from tuberculosis, according to the court’s ruling.
The accused have shouted the slogan ‘Dimtsachin Yisema (Let our voices be heard) upon the court’s reading of the sentences. The court premise was crowded with family and friends of the accused who were seen reacting with anger and despair against the court’s ruling. The Police from the city administration have quickly disbursed the families.
Their lawyer, Mustafa Sefi Suleman, told Addis Standard that the ruling was unjust as the accused were merely exercising their constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of expression.
Four of the 20 defendants: Ibrahim Kemer, Fitsum Chernet, Sheha Sudin Nesredin and Usman Abdu, are among the 38 inmates facing a separate charge suspected of setting the controversial fire that gutted the maximum security Qilinto prison.
The trial
The 20 were facing charges of terrorism for contravening article 7(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (652/2009) and criminal charges for violating articles 32(1) (a) and 38(1) of the FDRE Penal Code of 2004. Today’s sentencing brings to an end a trial that began in Dec. 2014.
They were initially accused of conspiring and entering into an agreement to coerce the government to release 18 members of the Ethiopian Muslim arbitration committee, from custody where they were being tried for terrorism related offenses. However, the charges have grown to include accusations of, among others, “organizing and communicating, including via telephone, to recruit members to incite violence and participating with terrorist organizations.”
Although the 18 members of the Ethiopian Muslim arbitration committee were jailed to lengthy terms of varying periods,the 20 individuals, including two journalists: Kalid Mohammed Ahmed, 26, and Darsema Sori Banqash, 48, from Radio Bilal, who were accused of coercing the state to release the 18, remained jailed.
In September 2016, Ethiopia’s President Mulatu Teshome has signed a certificate pardoning nine of the 18 members of the Ethiopian Muslim arbitration committee, including the first defendant, Abubeker Ahmed, a prominent Muslim scholar who was jailed for 22 years on August 03 2015.
However, prosecutors have continued pressing the charges against the 20 defendants. They are now found guilty by the federal high court this morning.
The charges against the 20 defendants also include “inciting protests among Muslims in the cities of Addis Abeba, Jimma and Wolkite by preparing and distributing fliers and stickers claiming that the government arrested “The Committee”; organizing unlawful demonstrations calling for and inciting protests.”
The trial over the last two years of Abubeker Ahmed and the remaining 19 has been marked by several irregularities including inconsistent witness statements and complaints by the defendants of having had no access to their lawyers and having been subjected to torture and duress.
Background
Ethiopian Muslims were protesting since 2011 against what many of them say were an uncalled for interference by the government in the affairs of their religion. The protests came to a disturbing twist on Monday Oct. 29th 2012 when a federal court in Addis Abeba decided to charge 29 Muslim protestors arrested in July of the same year with “plotting acts of terrorism” under the country’s infamous anti-terror proclamation.
Many of the arrested were the Ethiopian Muslim arbitration committee members who volunteered to become members in order to seek solutions to narrow the widening gap between Muslims and the government.
The three outstanding differences the Ethiopian Muslim arbitration committee, simply known as “The Committee”, were trying to resolve were the demand by Muslims for the restoration of the Awoliya College and Secondary School administration which was sacked by the government in Dec. 2011; a free election without the interference of the government to replace members of the Islamic Supreme Council (Mejlis), again sacked by the government; and an end to the government’s attempt to publish and distribute books which carry a new Islamic teaching called Al-Habesh. The government denied its hands were on all the three demands but claimed Awoliya College and Secondary School, a highly regarded Islamic school based in Addis Abeba, had become a breeding ground for radicalism and Wahabia.
The incident triggered one of the most disciplined and sustained Friday sit-in protests by hundreds of thousands of Muslim protestors here in Addis Abeba and other major towns throughout the country that lasted for more than four years. it also gave birth to a famous online activism on twitter and facebook by an underground group called ‘Dimtsachin Yisema’ (let our voices be heard) which has attracted the participation of thousands who campaigned for the release of the committee members and others arbitrarily detained during sit-in protests. However, the Friday-sit-in protests were often met by the presence of large numbers of police forces who at many occasions have clashed with protestors which led to polices’ brutal use of force.
The three years trial of the Ethiopian Muslim arbitration committee members until they were jailed in August 2015 hasn’t been without tense moments too. Most importantly, the judicial independence was believed to have been tarnished when a state sponsored documentary called “Jihadawi Harekat” was aired by the national television soon after the trial began. Legal experts believe the incriminating contents of the documentary had severely affected the independence of the judiciary, which struggles to maintain its distance from political pressures, often in vain.
In Mid December 2016, a radio station called Radio Daandii Haqaa released a new documentary called “The Movement” chronicling the story of Ethiopian Muslims and their struggle since 2011. AS
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