Ethiopia’s political troubles are going to test its beneficial China relationship

Addis Ababa’s light-rail network built by China Railway Engineering Corporation has become a key transport link for city residents. EPA/Solan Kolli

Nearly three months into the state of emergency declared by Ethiopia, the atmosphere on the streets of its bustling and impressively modern metropolis and capital, Addis Ababa, feels tense.

At 2,355m above sea level, the climate is pleasantly mild most of the year. Its broad thoroughfares are studded with magnificent cultural attractions. These are infused with the glow of an ancient yet resilient civilisation that could withstand both Jesuit and Wahhabi encroachment.

Yet, at present, tourists are understandably few and far between. There have been reports of hundreds of deaths in districts surrounding the capital in recent weeks. But these have been played down as an exaggeration by Prime Minister Heilemariam Desalegn.

Violence broke out during an Oromo religious festival, and in some instances foreigners seem to have been targeted. In response, the predominantly ethnic-Tigrean government clamped down on social media, took a few TV channels off the air, and restricted the movement of the opposition leader and foreign observers.

For the past few years, Ethiopia has been able to partly shed its association with abject poverty and famine. Arguably inspired by China, the country became a developmental success story and one of the fastest-growing countries in the world. At much the same time, Addis Ababa was able to capitalise on being the gateway to the politics of the African continent and foreign aid.

It is evident just how rapidly China’s stakes here have grown over the past few years. Just as evident is China’s different approach to development as compared with the West. It is also easy to see why the recent instability in Ethiopia is a real test to China’s approach.

Behind the veneer of Ethiopia’s parliamentary federalism lies an authoritarian system of state-led development that is preferred by Beijing over the country’s ragtag opposition forces. The question is whether the fruits of fast economic growth can be distributed sufficiently effectively in Ethiopia so as to forestall ethnic rural unrest.

Showcase infrastructural projects

Rather than providing grants directly aimed at poverty alleviation or promoting civil society, Chinese state-owned enterprises have been busy erecting showcase infrastructural projects. The aim is to attract further private business investment and to boost tourism.

The new sparkling African Union conference centre in Addis was fully funded by China. A new six-lane 87km highway to Adama has cut travel time from three hours to just one hour. And the international arm of China State Construction will soon give the capital a state-of-the-art stadium and upgrade its airport.

But perhaps a more persuasive productivity-booster is Addis Ababa’s new light-rail network completed in 2015 by China Railway Engineering Corporation. Often, the Chinese developmental approach is portrayed as construction frenzy ahead of genuine consumer demand.

Yet, far from being at risk of becoming a white elephant, it is already heavily used by local commuters just over a year after inauguration. In a city where taxi fares are exorbitant and buses are often in bad repair, the network is making a real difference to ordinary people’s lives.

But Beijing also runs a real risk here. In 2007, for example, 65 Ethiopians and nine Chinese expatriates were murdered by Somali separatists in an attack on a Sinopec-run oilfield in the east of the country. There is clearly a strong case for Heilemariam to broaden his government’s ethnic support base and heed various regional and rural concerns about disenfranchisement as a result of foreign investment.

No zero-sum game between the US and China

Unlike the Chinese Foreign Affairs ministry, the US State Department has expressed concern over the imposition of the state of emergency.

But the Ethiopian government is likely to remain in the US’s good books. This is primarily because of its role in countering the spread of fundamentalist terrorism in the Horn of Africa. In fact, it is that role that has helped endear Ethiopia to the world, and facilitated Western relief aid.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to conclude China’s growing stakes in Ethiopia immediately offset Western interests. For one thing, Ethiopia’s recent troubled history suggests the enemies of government often denounce oppression. But they do not necessarily champion human rights when they seize power themselves.

In addition, Western aid is still far greater and more vital to the running of the country than anything China provides. For all the speculation about the Chinese currency replacing the US dollar as global reserve currency soon, most hotels here do not seem to readily exchange China’s currency for Birr yet.

There is, in short, no zero-sum game between the US and China over Ethiopia, at times quite to the contrary. Neither power is interested in Ethiopia purely for exploitative colonial-style mineral extraction, or is purely motivated by altruism. The budding, somewhat desultory Chinatown in Addis Ababa’s Rwanda Vegetable Market hardly comes across as an insular colonial outpost. And the Chinese embassy compound is vastly outsized by the American one.

What plays out instead are perhaps different approaches to the low-income world where the US has prized the diffusion of individual freedoms and human-rights norms and China has prized collective economic betterment. And both the US and China are set to lose out if chaos spreads in the Horn of Africa.

China’s approach may be benefiting Ethiopia

Amid capital scarcity, China’s different approach seems to benefit Ethiopia. Put simply, it opens up another avenue for development where the World Bank and IMF doctrines have until recently been the only show in town.

In concrete terms, it means Chinese companies nowadays bid for projects often with concessional terms – where, in the past, only Western companies had the technological capacity to deliver.

Hydro-electricity is perhaps the best example for that: a healthy competition seems to be building up between Italy’s Salini Impregilo and Sinohydro when it comes to damming Ethiopia’s rivers. Local and foreign NGO oversight would still be vital in order to minimise the dislocation and environmental degradation that both companies can cause.

But, at the same time, with better planning, the untapped potential of hydro-power might mean cleaner and lower-cost energy in a part of the world where power cuts are all too common.

source:https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-political-ripple-a-big-test-for-infrastructure-led-chinese-approach-70659

Ethiopia is on a path to become Africa’s China in more ways than one

Written by Dee Abdella
(OPride) — Ethiopia’s dream to be the next China is becoming true. As Beijing rapidly expands its global footprints, its overseas national interests have to be protected. This is why China is already moving away from its traditional hands-off approach — a policy of non-interference in state’s domestic affairs — to become one of the global influencers of our time.

This paradigm shift is more evident in Africa than anywhere else as China continues to deepen its presence in the continent. A closer examination of China’s bilateral relations with Ethiopia makes point clear.

Prior to 1991, when the incumbent regime in Ethiopia came to power, the two countries did not have much contact but their mutual respect and interaction have grown over the past two decades. But Ethio-Chinese relations had improved remarkably in the last few years.

Ethiopia is a regional hub with several international organizations headquartered in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa). Beijing recognizes the potential of this for access to regional powers and markets, as well as the Ethiopia’s immediate and a seemingly insatiable need for loans and other development aid to bolster its infrastructures. Ethiopia also has a large and growing consumer base that’s already about 100 million strong. In fact, China has been Ethiopia’s largest trading partner. The current Sino-Ethiopia trade volume exceeds $3 billion.

Ethiopia is also relying heavily on Chinese loans to develop its foundations. For example, the Tekeze River Dam in Tigray region, one of Ethiopia’s mega hydroelectric projects and the highest dam on the African Continent, was built by the Chinese. China is also financing new dams being built on the Omo River in southwestern Ethiopia and the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River. The Chinese have built most of the roads in Ethiopia, including the Ethio-Djibouti railway project, the telecommunications infrastructure, and the much-celebrated light rail system in Addis Ababa. In fact, according to the Heritage Foundation and American Institute, China’s total investment in Ethiopia in 2016 is over $20 billion.

The economic relationship between China and Ethiopia has become stronger through both Chinese direct investment and trade in Ethiopia since the early 2000s. The sum of Chinese contracts in road construction, electricity and telecommunication sectors show a surge in Chinese foreign direct investment in the last few years. Dozens of Chinese firms are currently engaged in the construction of roads throughout the country, managing nearly 70 percent of the roadwork in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is hoping to become the hub of light manufacturing in Africa and the government plans to establish 6 industrial parks within the next few years. The plan is backed by Chinese entrepreneurs and the Asia Development Bank Member States. The construction of an industrial park is estimated to cost around $500 million per park.  Ethiopia will not benefit as the industrial zones in part because the project is slated to flood the local market with competitive Chinese products, traders and workers. Besides, China’s political economy is based on state-sponsored economic relationship. As such, the investments are not meant to produce sustainable development in Ethiopia rather to secure Beijing’s long-term geopolitical strategy in the Horn of Africa.

Political relationship

Ethio-China relations are not confined to the economic realm. The two countries have been supportive of each other politically as well. For example, in 2007 Ethiopia joined other African countries to stop the UN Human Rights Commission ruling that would have condemned China’s human rights practices. For its part, China never criticizes Ethiopia’s atrocious human rights record or comment publicly on Ethiopia’s internal conflicts. As former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, noted in April 2015:

Chinese influence in Ethiopia today is equal to over rivals that of any other country, including the US. The leadership of the ruling EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) certainly gives the impression that it is more comfortable with the style and leadership of the Communist Part of China (CPC) than with the leadership and ruling parties of Western countries, including the US. The EPRDF and the CPC frequently exchange visits and have even formalized their interaction. While the EPRDF has an on-going relationship with a few Western political parties, it is doubtful they are as close as they are with the CPC…at the political level, China and Ethiopia have been supportive of each other. The Ethiopian Parliament passed a resolution in support of China’s Anti-Secession Law. Ethiopia has joined other African countries in stopping resolutions in the UN Human right Commission that censor China’s human rights practices. Former prime minster [sic] Meles Zenawi stated emphatically that Tibet is internal affair and outsider have no right to interfere.

Nevertheless, it appears that China recognizes the strategic importance of its relationship with the Ethiopian government regardless of the unpredictable economic realities in both countries. Both see each other as comrades in arms who benefited more from bilateral agreements and preferential relations.

Military relationship

China has also been active on Africa’s regional security scene. In 2008, Beijing was part of the global anti-piracy effort in Somalia. It has also contributed over $100 million aid to the African Union (AU) to bolster its combat capacity and peacekeeping missions. In addition, China’s 2014 decision to deploy its military in South Sudan shows Beijing’s growing, direct involvement in Horn of Africa.

China recently completed a naval base in Djibouti to host a few thousand Chinese troops. This suggests China is in full force to challenge the U.S. military positioning in the Horn of Africa. It is also the clearest indication of China’s departure from its traditional hands-off approach. As U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, Tom Kelly, noted recently, China’s marine base in close proximity to United States’ Camp Lemonnier poses a clear concern for U.S. national security interests. Djibouti is vital Washington’s fight against terrorism in Africa and around the globe. The US uses Camp Lemonnier for its anti-terrorism operation across Africa, including the U.S. fight against Al-Shabab in Somalia, and a similar operation in Yemen against the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). That mission involves controlling the Red Sea and Suez Canal, one of the world’s busiest shipping routes. It remains to be seen how China’s presence alters the patrolling of these vital crossings.

China and Ethiopia have also increased their military cooperation since Chinese Premier LI Keqiang visited Addis Ababa in May 2014. China has a resident military attaché in Ethiopia and is the main provider of light arms and armored vehicles for the country. To be clear, China is not yet directly influencing Ethiopian military. China is propping up the regime in Addis for the long game — its motivations are diplomatic, strategic and ideological.

As such, at least for now, the Chinese appear far more interested in economic gains and in building Beijing’s influence and soft power across the continent.  Encouraged by Beijing’s huge financial assistances and political support, Ethiopia has become increasingly bellicose and autocratic, curtailing free speech and assembly rights and increasing arbitrary arrests of the opposition’s leaders, as well as the use of torture.

Since November 2015, Ethiopia has been rocked by widespread and popular Oromo protests. The protests erupted over fears by Oromo people and activists that the Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia Special Zone integrated development master plan will illegally displace millions of Oromo farmers from their ancestral lands and eventually cleanse the Oromo culture and identity from the affected areas. The plan was a continuation of the government’s land grab policies that have already displaced more 200,000 Oromo farmers and their families for the development of industrial zones.

China has truly been crucial to the Ethiopian regime’s survival. Ethiopia sees Beijing as a substitute to the Western countries and their aid conditionality. There are several similarities to China of the 1980s’ in the Ethiopia of 2016. Ethiopia daily violates the political and civil rights of its citizens by denying them the basic freedoms of speech, association and assembly. Ethiopia’s State of emergency and draconian rules decreed in October 2016, mainly to suppress any dissent voices in the country can be related to the Cultural Revolution in China and its aftermath into the early 1980s. Ethiopia is on the path that China blazed 30 years ago. Foreign observers and the Ethiopia regime have zoomed on the economic side of things. But, beneath the headlines, Ethiopia’s journey toward becoming Africa’s China is manifesting itself in more ways than one.

Source: http://linkis.com/Btue9