Five Journalists Arrested in Ethiopia

Early last week, on Monday, June 22, five journalists were invited to a press conference under false pretenses and arrested by authorities in the small town of Wajale, Ethiopia, which is located near the Somali border. Soon after, four of the five journalists were released while one, Muktar Nuh with the Horn Cable TV (HCTV), remains in jail. HCTV was also taken off the air and made to stop broadcasting. This event, that raises questions about human rights in Ethiopia, comes at a time when the country is trying to highlight the positive economic effects of its reconstruction.

There has been no reason provided by the Ethiopian government for the arrest of the five journalists, but this type of treatment of media is not completely uncommon in the region. There are presently other journalists imprisoned in Ethiopia and one ongoing case in Hargeisa involving another Somali reporter. There are concerns that government officials encourage “tight security” that “restricts the political and civil rights of the ethnic Somalis.” For reporters who travel to areas like Ogaden, which is situated in eastern Ethiopia near the Somali border, often they must be accompanied by government representatives as was the case recently for an Al-Jazeera news crew.

Read more :http://guardianlv.com/2016/06/five-journalists-arrested-in-ethiopia/

Zelalem Workagegnehu sentenced to 5 yrs and Four months for blogging

Zelalem Workagegnehu, co-blogger of De Birhan Blog and whose works had appeared on various Diaspora websites, has been sentenced to five years and four months by the Ethiopian regime controlled court in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia today.

Zelalem has already been detained for nearly two years.

Zelalem was finishing his Masters Degree in Public Administration at the Addis Abeba University, in July 2014 when he was detained together with nine other opposition politicians, netizens, and activists.

The Court had acquitted  five of the defendants  in August 2015 and two more of Zelalem’s co-defendants on April 15, 2016 when it found Zelalem and two other co-defendants of Zelalem guilty of “supporting terror in any way.”

The movement he is accused of supporting is known as Ginbot 7 (Arebgenoch Ginbot 7 Movement), a pro-democracy movement founded by Professor Berhanu Nega, an Ethiopian economist, who lectured in Bucknell University, U.S.A. The Ethiopian government labelled his movement as well as few other Ethiopian opposition groups as “Terrorist Groups” in 2010.

Like several Ethiopian activists, journalists and politicians, Zelalem was initially accused of being a member and local leader of Ginbot 7 although the charges were later changed. Zelalem in his defense statements maintained that he has never been a member of Ginbot 7 and does not believe Ginbot 7 is a terror organisation, he does believe in bringing social change only through nonviolent means and is against any form of violence.

Zelalem Workagegnehu’s Trial TimelineÂ

July 8, 2014 – Zelalem Workagegnehu along with seven of his friends and one of his brothers were detained by the Ethiopian Federal Police and Securities. Few months later his older brother and four of his friends were later released after going through long interrogations and torture.

One of his relatives, Eyob, who faced the most torture and ordeal, had agreed with the prosecutors to testify against Zelalem and his colleagues and thus was subsequently released.

October 31, 2014 - After four months of investigation, torture and interrogation 10 people were officially charged. The 10 are charged under the file of Zelalem Workagenehu were:

1. Zelalem Workagenhu – a postgraduate student of Addis Abeba University and a writer

2. Habtamu Ayalew – Public Relations Head of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ)

3. Daniel Shibeshi – Organisational Affairs Head of UDJ

4. Abraha Desta – Central Committee member of Arena Party and lecturer at Mekele University

5. Yeshiwas Assfea – Council member of Blue (Semayawi Party)

6. Yonatan Wolde – charged with applying for a digital security course.

7. Abraham Solomon – linked with Zelalem in the Charge.

8. Solomon Girma

9. Bahiru Degu – charged with applying for a digital security course.

10. Tesfaye Teferi

The two main morals of the charges are one “working together with terrorist organisations� and “membership in Ginbot 7 and participation in criminal activities�.  The first defendant Zelalem has been charged of being a leader of Ginbot 7 and recruiting members�. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants have been charged of using legally registered opposition party as a cover to pursue the aims of Ginbot 7 and also using social media to contact Fasil Yenealem, whom the charge referred to as a member of the Movement and others.

Nov. 20, 2014 – They were all denied bail. The Court ordered the prosecutor to complete its evidences on the detainees and submit them on 27 November, 2014.

December 18, 2014 -Â given another appointment to reappear in Court on December 25, 2014. Reappointed.

Feb. 3, 2015 -Â Court Declines To Accept The Objections And Defense Of Writer Zelalem Workagegnehu Et Al. Adjourned the hearing to February 19, 2015.

Feb.19, 2015 – They given another appointment to appear again on March 4, 2015 by the Lideta Court.

 March 19, 2015 - Court appointed the defendants to May 21, 22 and 25, 2015 respectively to hear the prosecutors witnesses.
 June 08, 2015 – The Criminal Bench of  the Lideta Federal High Court  in Addis Abeba started hearing the prosecutor’s witnesses.

 June 11, 2015 –  Court tells Zelalem to appear in Court on Monday June 15, 2015 for decisions after witnesses testimony was heard.

June 17, 2015 -  Court adjourns for July 8, 2015 to give verdict on the Public Prosecutor’s evidences.

July 8, 2015 - Court re-appoints co-blogger Zelalem Workagegnehu et al to July 22 to give verdict on Public Prosecutor’s evidences.

July 21, 2016 -Â Court rejects Zelalem Workagegnehu et al counter-evidence

August 20, 2015 - Five, charged under the file of De Birhan’s Co-blogger Zelalem, acquitted, Zelalem told to Defend. Court adjourned their case to  November 7-9, 2015

August 24, 2015 – Prosecutor lodges an appeal against the acquitted.

November 23, 2015 – Hearing of defense witnesses begins.

November 24, 2015 -Â Second day of Court hearing, defense witnesses of Yonatan heard.

November 26, 2015 -Â Fourth Day of Court hearing of Zelalem Workagengnhu et al.

November 27, 2015 – hearing postponed to next week Dec.4, 2015 due to incomplete judicial panel.

December 4, 2015 - Zelalem’s witnesses not summoned, case adjourned to December 16.

December 16, 2015 -Co-blogger Zelalem Workagegnehu appears on CPJ’S 2015 prison census.

December 16, 2015 - Kaliti Prison Admin refuses to allow Eskinder Nega to be a defense witness of  co-blogger Zelalem.

January 27, 2016 -Â Eskinder Nega did not testify again, adjourned for Feb. 5

February 5, 2016 -Â Eskinder Nega defends our co-blogger Zelalem Workagegnehu.

February 24, 2016 - Andargachew didnot testify, Court postpones co-blogger Zelalem’s trail due to judges absence and Court takes Andargachew’s failure to testify as Zelalem’s own fault.

March 4, 2016 - Court  appoints on April 7, 2016  to give verdict on Co-Blogger Zelalem Workagegnehu et al’s fate

April 7, 2016 – Verdict adjourned for tomorrow April 15

April 15, 2016 - Ethiopian regime’s Court says Co-blogger Zelalem Workagegnehu is guilty, Co-defendants Bahiru Degu and Yonatan Wolde acquitted

April 18, 2016 - Yonatan Wolde & Bahiru Degu detained in Me’akelawi Prison hours after release.

April 26, 2016 -Â Prosecutor submits sentencing aggravation statement. Sentencing adjourned to May 10, 2016.

May 10, 2016 – Co-Blogger Zelalem Workagegnehu sentenced to five years and four months.

Source:http://debirhan.com/?p=9457

Ethiopia Computer Crime Proclamation Text Draft

A PROCLAMATION TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMPUTER CRIME

WHEREAS information and communication technology plays a vital role in the economic, social and political development of the country;

WHEREAS unless appropriate protection and security measures are taken, the utilization of information communication technology is vulnerable to various computer crimes and other security threats that can impede the overall development of the country and endanger individual rights;

WHEREAS the existing laws are not adequately tuned with the technological changes and are not sufficient to prevent, control, investigate and prosecute the suspects of computer crimes;

WHEREAS it has become necessary to incorporate new legal mechanisms and procedures in order to prevent, control, investigate and prosecute computer crimes and facilitate the collection of electronic evidences;

NOW,  THEREFORE,  in  accordance  with Article  55(1)  of  the Constitution  of  the  Federal Democratic  Republic  of  Ethiopia,  it  is  hereby proclaimed as follows:

PART ONE – GENERAL

1. Short Title

This Proclamation may be cited as the “Computer Crime Proclamation No. —/2016”.

2. Definitions

In this Proclamation unless the context otherwise requires:

1/ “data processing service” means the service of reception, storage, processing, emission, routing or transmission of data by means of computer system and includes networking services;

2/ “computer or computer system” means any software and the microchips technology based data  processing, storage, analysis, dissemination and communication device or any device that is capable of performing logical, arithmetic or routing function and includes accessories of that device;

3/ “computer data” means any content data, traffic data, computer program, or any other subscriber information in a form suitable for processing by means of a computer system;

4/ “computer program” means a set of instructions or commands expressed in words, codes or schemes which are capable of causing a computer system to perform or achieve a particular task or result;

5/ “traffic data” means any computer generated data relating to a chain of communication by means of a computer system indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, duration, size or types of underlying service;

6/ “content data” means any computer data found in the form of audio, video, picture, arithmetic formula or any other form that conveys the essence, substance, meaning or purpose of  a stored or transmitted computer data or computer communication;

7/ “network” means the interconnection of two or more computer systems by which data processing service can be provided or received;

8/ “computer data security” means the protection of a computer data from deleting, changing, and accessing by unauthorized person, compromising its confidentiality or any other damage;

9/ “access” means to communicate with, to enter in, store in, store data in, retrieve, or obtain data from, to view, to receive, move or copy data from a computer system, or otherwise make use of any data processing service thereof;

10/ “critical infrastructure” means a computer system, network or data where any of the crimes stipulated under article 3 to 6 of this proclamation, is committed against it, would have a considerable damage on public safety and the national interest;

11/ “interception” means real-time surveillance, recording, listening, acquisition, viewing, controlling or any other similar act of data processing service or computer data;

12/ “spam” means unsolicited e-mails transmitted to multiple electronic accounts at a time;

13/ “service provider” means a person who provides technical data processing or communication service or alternative infrastructure to users by means of computer system;

14/ “Ministry” or “Minister” means the Ministry or Minister of Justice, respectively;

15/ “Public Prosecution Department” means federal public prosecutor department legally vested with the power and function of prosecution or delegated regional state public prosecutor departments;

16/ “investigatory organ” mean a person legally invested with the power of investigation;

17/“regional state” means any state referred to in Article 47(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and for the purpose this Proclamation it includes Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations;

18/ “police” mean Federal Police or Regional State Police to whom the power of the Federal Police is delegated;

19/ “Agency” mean Information Network Security Agency;

20/ “person” means a physical or juridical person;

21/ any expression in the masculine gender includes the feminine.

PART TWO – COMPUTER CRIMES

SECTION ONE – CRIMES AGAINST COMPUTER SYSTEM AND COMPUTER DATA

3. Illegal Access

1/ Whosoever, without authorization or in excess of authorization, intentionally secures access to the whole or any part of computer system, computer data or network shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding three years or fine from Birr 30,000 to 50, 000 or both.

2/ Where the crime stipulated under sub-article (1) of this Article is committed against:

a) a computer system, computer data or network that is exclusively destined for the use of a legal person, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from three to five years and fine from Birr 30,000 to 50,000;

b) a critical infrastructure, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from five to 10 years and fine from Birr 50,000 to 100,000.

4. Illegal Interception

1/ Whosoever, without authorization or in excess of authorization, intentionally intercepts non-public computer data or data processing service shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine from Birr 10,000 to 50,000.

2/ Where the crime stipulated under sub-article (1) of this Article is committed against:

a) a computer data or data processing service that is exclusively destined for the use of a legal person, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from five to 10 years and fine from Birr 50,000 to 100,000.

b) a critical infrastructure, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 15 years and fine from Birr 100,000 to 200,000.

 5. Interference with Computer System

1/ Whosoever, without authorization or in excess of authorization, intentionally hinders, impairs, interrupts or disrupts the proper functioning of the whole or any part of computer system by inputting, transmitting, deleting or altering computer data shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment from three years to five years and fine not exceeding Birr 50,000.

2/ where the crime stipulated under sub-article (1) of this Article is committed against:

a) a computer system that is exclusively destined for the use of a legal person, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from five to 10 years and fine from Birr 50,000 to 100,000;

b) a critical infrastructure, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from 10 years to 20 years.

 6. Causing Damage to Computer Data

1/ Whosoever, without authorization or in excess of authorization, intentionally alters, deletes, suppresses a computer data, renders it meaningless, useless or inaccessible to authorized users shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding three years and fine not exceeding Birr 30,000.

2/ Where the crime stipulated under sub-article (1) of this Article is committed against:

a) a computer data that is exclusively destined for the use of a legal person, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from three years to five years and fine from Birr 30,000 to 50,000;

b) a critical infrastructure, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from five to 10 years and fine from Birr 50,000 to 100,000.

7. Criminal Acts Related to Usage of Computer Devices and Data

1/ Whosoever, knowing that it can cause damage to computer system, computer data or network, intentionally transmits any computer program exclusively designed or adapted for this purpose shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding five years or fine not exceeding Birr 50,000.

2/ Whosoever, knowing that it is to be used for the commission of unlawful act specified under Articles 3 to 6 of this Proclamation, intentionally imports, produces, offers for sale, distributes or makes available any computer device or computer program designed or adapted exclusively for the purpose of committing such crimes shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine from Birr 10,000 to 50,000.

3/ Whosoever possesses any computer devices or data specified under sub-article (1) or (2) of this Article with the intention to further the commission of any of the crimes specified under Articles 3 to 6 of this Proclamation shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding three years or fine from Birr 5,000 to 30, 000.

4/ Whosoever, without authorization or in excess of authorization, intentionally discloses or transfers any computer program, secret code, key, password or any other similar data for gaining access to a computer system, computer data or network shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding five years or in serious cases with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine from Birr 10,000 to 50,000.

5/ Where the crime stipulated under sub-article (4) of this Article is committed negligently, the punishment shall be simple imprisonment not exceeding one year and fine.

8. Aggravated Cases

Where the crime stipulated under Article 3 to 6 of this Proclamation is committed against a computer data or a computer system or network which is designated as top secrete by the concerned body for military interest or international relation, and while the country is at a state of emergency or threat, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment from 15 to 25 years.

SECTION TWO – COMPUTER RELATED FORGERY, FRAUD AND THEFT 

9. Computer Related Forgery

Whosoever falsifies a computer data, makes false computer data or makes use of such data to injure the rights or interests of another or to procure for himself or for another person any undue right or advantage shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding three years and fine not exceeding Birr 30,000 or in a serious cases with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding 10 years and fine from Birr 10,000 to 100,000.

10. Computer Related Fraud

1/ Whosoever fraudulently causes a person to act in a manner prejudicial to his rights or those of third person by distributing misleading computer data, misrepresenting his status, concealing facts which he had a duty to reveal or taking advantage of the person’s erroneous beliefs, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine not exceeding Birr 50,000.

2/ Whosoever, with fraudulent intent of procuring any benefit for himself or for another person, causes economic loss to another person by any change, deletion or any other damage of computer data shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine from Birr 10,000 to 50,000 or in serious cases with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding 10 years and fine from Birr 10,000 to 100,000.

11. Electronic Identity Theft

Whosoever, with intent to commit criminal act specified under Article 10 of this Proclamation or for any other purpose produces, obtains, sales, possesses or transfers any data identifying electronic identity of another person without authorization of that person shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding five years or fine not exceeding Birr 50,000.

SECTION THREE – ILLEGAL CONTENT DATA

12. Obscene or Indecent Crimes Committed Against Minors

1/ Whosoever intentionally produces, transmits, sales, distributes, makes available or possesses without authorization any picture, poster, video or image through a computer system that depicts:

a) a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; or

b) a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct;

shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment from three years to 10 years.

2/ Whosoever entices or solicits a minor for sexual explicit conduct by transmitting or sending erotic speeches, pictures, text messages or videos through computer system  shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment from five to 10 years.

13. Crimes against Liberty and Reputation of Persons

Whosoever intentionally:

1/ intimidates or threatens another person or his families with serious danger or injury by disseminating any writing, video, audio or any other image through a computer systems shall be punishable, with simple imprisonment not exceeding three years or in a serious cases with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years.

2/ causes fear, threat or psychological strain on another person by sending or by repeatedly transmitting information about the victim or his families through computer system or by keeping the victim’s computer communication under surveillance shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding five years or in serious case with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding 10 years.

3/ disseminates any writing, video, audio or any other image through a computer system that is defamatory to the honor or reputation of another person shall be punishable, upon complaint, with simple imprisonment not exceeding three years or fine or both.

14. Crimes against Public Security

Without prejudice to the provisions Article 257 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Whosoever intentionally disseminates through a computer system any written, video, audio or any other picture that incites fear, violence, chaos or conflict among people shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding three years.

15. Dissemination of Spam

1/ Whosoever, with intent to advertise or sell any product or service, disseminates messages to multiple e-mail addresses at a time shall be  punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding three years and fine  or, in serious case, with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine not exceeding Birr 50,000.

2/ Notwithstanding the provision of sub-article (1) of this Article, dissemination of commercial advertisement through email account shall not be punishable provided that:

a) there is prior consent from the recipient;

b) the primary purpose of the advertisement is to introduce customers with new products or services and the customers have willing; or

c) the advertisement contains valid identity and address of the sender, and valid and simple way for the recipient to reject or unsubscribe receipt of further advertisement from the same source.

16. Criminal Liability of Service Providers

A service provider shall be criminally liable in accordance with Articles 12 to 14, of this Proclamation for any illegal computer content data disseminated through its computer systems by third parties, if it has:

1/ directly involved in the dissemination or edition of the content data;

2/ upon obtaining actual knowledge that the content data is illegal, failed to take any measure to remove or to disable access to the content data; or

3/ failed to take appropriate measure to remove or to disable access to the content data upon obtaining notice from competent administrative authorities.

SECTION FOUR – OTHER OFFENCES

17. Failure to Cooperate and Hindrance of Investigation

Whosoever:

1/ fails to comply with the obligations provided for under sub-article (2) of Article 23, sub-article (6) of Article 24, sub-article (2) of Article 29, sub-article (2) of Article 30 or sub-article (4) of Article 31 of this Proclamation, shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding one year or fine;

2/ intentionally hinders the investigation process of computer crimes conducted pursuant to this Proclamation shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine not exceeding Birr 50,000.

18. Criminal Act Stipulated in Other Laws

Where any crime other than those provided for under this Part is committed by means of a computer, the relevant law shall apply.

19. Concurrent Crimes

Where any of the criminal acts provided for under this Part has resulted in the commission of another crime punishable under any special law or criminal code, the relevant provision shall apply concurrently.

20. Penalty Imposed on Juridical Person

Notwithstanding sub-article  (1), (3) and (4) of Article 90 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,  where any offence stipulated under this Part is committed by juridical person,

1/ the penalty shall be fine from Birr 50,000 to 500,000 for a crime punishable with fine;

2/ when the penalty provided for is imprisonment, the penalty shall be:

a) a fine not exceeding 50,000 Birr for a crime punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding three years,

b) a fine not exceeding 100,000 Birr for a crime punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding five years,

c) a fine not exceeding 150,000 Birr for a crime punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years,

d) a fine not exceeding 200,000 Birr for a crime punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding 10 years,

e) a fine of up to the general maximum laid down in sub-article (1) of this Article for a crime punishable with rigorous imprisonment exceeding 10 years.

3/ Where fine is expressly provided as punishment for a crime, it shall be five fold. 

PART THREE – PREVENTIVE AND INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES

21. General

1/ Computer crime prevention and investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Part.

2/ Without prejudice the provisions of this Part, for issues not clearly covered in this law, the provisions of the Criminal Code and other relevant laws shall be applicable to computer crimes.

22. Investigative Power

1/ The public prosecutor and police shall have joint power to investigate criminal acts provided for in this Proclamation. And the public prosecutor shall lead the investigation process.

2/ Where requested to support the investigation process, the Agency shall provide technical support, conduct analysis on collected information, and provide evidences if necessary.

23. Retention of Computer Data

1/ Without prejudice to any provision stipulated in other laws, any service provider shall retain the computer data disseminated through its computer systems or data relating to data processing or communication service for at least one year.

2/ The data shall be kept in secret unless a court or public prosecutor orders for disclosure.

24. Real-time Collection of Computer Data

Without prejudice special provisions stipulated under other laws,

1/ to prevent computer crimes and collect evidence related information, the investigatory organ may, request court warrant to intercept in real-time or conduct surveillance, on computer data, data processing service, or internet and other related communications of suspects, and the court shall decide and determine a relevant organ that could execute interception or surveillance as necessary.

2/ Sub-article (1) of this Article shall only be applicable when there is no other means readily available for collecting such data and this is approved and decided by the Minister.

3/ Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article (1) and (2) of this Article, the Minister may give permission to the investigatory organ to conduct interception or surveillance without court warrant where there are reasonable grounds and urgent cases to believe that a computer crime that can damage critical infrastructure is or to be committed.

4/ The Minister shall present the reasons for interception or surveillance without court warrant under sub-article (3) of this Article to the President of the Federal High Court within 48 hours, and the president shall give appropriate order immediately.

5/ Unless believed that it is necessary to conduct other criminal investigation, any irrelevant information collected pursuant to sub-articles (1) to (4) of this Article shall be destroyed immediately upon the decision of the Minister.

6/ Any service provider shall cooperate when requested to carry on activities specified under sub-articles (1) and (3) of this Article.

7/ Without prejudice sub-article (5) of this Article, any information collected in accordance with this Article shall be kept confidential.

25. Protection of Computer, Computer System or Infrastructure from Danger

1/ Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a computer crime is to be committed and it is necessary to prevent and control the crime, provide early warning to citizens, to minimize the risks or for effectiveness of the investigation,  the Agency in collaboration with the investigatory organ, may conduct sudden searches, conduct digital forensic investigation, provide appropriate security equipment or take other similar measures on computers, computer systems or infrastructures that are suspected to be attacked or deemed to be the sources of attack.

2/ For the implementation of the provision of sub-article (1) of this Article, as may be necessary and upon request, concerned organs shall have duty to cooperate.

26. Duty to Report

1/ Any service provider who has knowledge of the commission of the crimes stipulated in this Proclamation or dissemination of any illegal content data by third parties through the computer system it administers shall immediately notify the Agency, accordingly report to the police about the crime and take appropriate measures.

2/ The Agency may issue a directive as to the form and procedures of reporting.

27. Arrest and Detention

Without prejudice the provisions stipulated in special laws,

1/ where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a computer crime is committed or under commission, police may arrest suspects in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

2/ Where the investigation on the person arrested pursuant to sub-article (1) of this Article is not completed, remand may be granted in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code; provided, however, the overall remand period may not exceed four months.

PART FOUR – EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

28. General

1/ Computer crime proceedings and collection of evidence shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Part.

2/ Without prejudice to the provisions of this Part, the General Part provisions of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code shall be applicable to computer Crimes.

29. Order for Preservation of Computer Data 

1/ Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a computer data required for computer crime investigation is vulnerable to loss or

modification, the investigatory organ may order, in writing, a person to preserve the specified data under his control or possession.

2/ The person ordered under sub-article (1) of this Article shall immediately take necessary measures to secure the specified computer data and preserve it for three months and keep such order confidential.

3/ The investigatory organ may order only a one-time extension for another three months up on the expiry of the period stipulated under sub-article (2) of this Article.  

 30. Order for Obtaining of Computer Data

1/ Where a computer data under any person’s possession or control is reasonably required for purposes of a computer crime investigation, the investigatory organ may apply to the court to obtain or gain access to that computer data.

2/ If the court is satisfied, it may, without requiring the appearance of the person concerned, order the person who is in possession or control of the specified computer data, to produce it to the investigatory organ or give access to same.

31. Access, Search and Seizure

1/ Where it is necessary for computer crime investigation, the investigatory organ may, upon getting court warrant, search or access physically or virtually any computer system, network or computer data.

2/ Where the investigatory organ reasonably believes that the computer data sought is stored in another computer system and can be obtained by same computer system, the search or access may be extended to that other computer system without requesting separate search warrant.

3/ In the execution of search under sub-article (1) or (2) of this Article, the investigatory organ may:

a) seize any computer system or computer data;

b) make and retain a copy or photograph data obtained through search;

c) maintain the integrity of the relevant stored data by using any technology;

d) render inaccessible the stored data from the computer system on which search is conducted; or

e) recover deleted data.

4/ In the execution of search, the investigatory organ may order any person who has knowledge in the course of his duty about the functioning of the

computer system or network or measures applied to protect the data therein to provide the necessary information or computer data that can facilitate the search or access..

5/ Where the investigatory organ finds the functioning of a computer system or computer data is in violation of the provisions this Proclamation or other relevant laws, it may request the court to order for such computer data or computer system to be rendered inaccessible or restricted or blocked. The court shall give the appropriate order within 48 hours after the request is presented.

6/ Where the search process on juridical person requires the presence of the manager or his agent, the investigatory organ shall take appropriate measure to do so.

32. Admissibility of Evidences

1/ Any  document  or  a  certified  copy  of  the document  or  a  certified  printout of  any electronic  record relating to computer data seized in accordance with this Proclamation may be produced as evidence during court proceedings and  shall  be admissible.

2/ Without prejudice to the admissibility of evidences to be produced in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code and other relevant laws, any digital or electronic evidence:

a) produced in accordance with this Proclamation; or

b) obtained from foreign law enforcement bodies shall be admissible in court of law in relation to computer crimes.

33. Authentication

Without prejudice to the authentication of written documents stipulated in other laws, any person who produces evidences provided under Article 32 of this Proclamation in a court proceeding has the burden to prove its authenticity.

34. Original Electronic Document

1/ Any electronic record which is obtained upon proof of the authenticity of the electronic records system or by which the data was recorded or stored shall be presumed original electronic document

2/ Without prejudice to sub-article (1) of this Article, the electronic printout which is obtained using a secured system under regular operation shall be considered original electronic evidence.

3/ Where the authenticity of an electronic record is not proved, any evidence that shows the following fact shall be admissible.

a) the computer system was operating properly or the fact of it’s not operating properly did not affect the integrity of the electronic record; or

b) it is established that the electronic record was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the other litigant party seeking to introduce it; or

c) it is established that the electronic record was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not record or store it under the control of the party seeking to introduce the record.

35. Presumption of Courts

When assessing the admissibility of evidence in accordance with this   Proclamation, the court may have regard to the procedure, standard or manner in which a similar computer system is functioning.

 36. Burden of proof

1/ Public prosecutor has the burden of proofing material facts regarding the cases brought to the court in accordance with the standards stipulated in law.

2/ Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article (1) of this Article, upon proof of basic facts of the case by the public prosecutor if the court believes necessary to shift the burden of proofing to the accused, the court may do so.

PART FIVE – INSTITUTIONS THAT FOLLOW UP CASES OF COMPUTER CRIME

37. Public Prosecutor and Police Following up Cases of Computer Crime

1/ A public prosecutor or investigative officer empowered to follows up computer crime cases in accordance with the powers conferred by law shall have the responsibility to enforce and cause to enforce the provisions of this Proclamation.

2/ Public prosecution office and Police empowered in this Proclamation may organize separate specialized task units when necessary to follow-up computer crimes.

38. Duty of the Agency

The Agency shall have duty to establish online computer crimes investigation system and provide other necessary investigation technologies.

39. Jurisdiction

1/ The Federal High Court shall have first instance jurisdiction over computer crime stipulated under this Proclamation.

2/ The judicial jurisdictions stipulated under Article 13 and paragraph (b) of sub-article (1) of Article 17 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2004 Criminal Code shall include computer crimes.

 40. Establishment of Executing Task Force

1/ Without prejudice the power of the Agency to lead national cyber security operation as stipulated in other relevant laws, a  National  Executing Task Force  comprising  the  heads  of  the Ministry  of  Justice,  the Federal Police Commission and other relevant bodies shall be established  in order to prevent and control computer crimes.

2/ The Minister of Ministry of Justice shall lead the Executing Task Force, identify other relevant organizations to be incorporated in the Task Force and ensure their representation.

3/ The Task Force shall, for the prevention and control computer crimes, develop national discussion forum, discuss on occasional dangers materialized and provide recommendation thereof, design short and long-term plans to be performed by the respective institutions as well as put in place synchronized system by coordinating various relevant organs.

PART SIX – MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

41. International Cooperation

1/ The Ministry of Justice shall cooperate and may sign agreements with the competent authority of another country in matters concerning computer crime, including the exchange of information, joint investigations, extradition and other  assistances in accordance with this Proclamation and agreements to which Ethiopia is a party and within the limits of the country’s legal system.

2/ For the implementation of this Proclamation, the investigatory organ, when necessary, may exchange information, perform joint cooperation in other forms or sign agreement with institutions of another country having similar mission.

3/ Any information or evidence obtained pursuant to this Article shall apply for the purpose of prevention or investigation of computer crimes.

42. Suspension, Confiscation or Blockage of Computer System or Asset

1/ The court, in sentencing an offender under this Proclamation, may give additional order for the suspension, confiscation or removal of any computer system, data or device or blockage of data processing service used in the perpetration of the offence.

2/ The property or proceedings of the accused that he directly or indirectly acquired through the computer crime for which he has been convicted shall be confiscate if the accused is convicted through a final decision;

3/ Unless they are contradictory to the provisions of this Proclamation, the relevant provisions of the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation No. 434/2005 (as amended) shall be applicable with respect to restraining or forfeiture order of computer system, data, equipment or other assets.

43. Repeal and Inapplicable Laws

1/ Articles 706 to 711 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and article 5 of Telecom Fraud Offence proclamation no. 761/2012 are hereby repealed.

2/ No proclamation, regulations, directives or practices shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with this Proclamation, be applicable with respect to matters provided for by this Proclamation.

44. Effective Date

This  Proclamation  shall  enter  into  force  on the  date  of  its publication  in  the  Federal Negarit Gazeta

Source:http://www.addisinsight.com/2016/05/09/ethiopia-computer-crime-proclamation-text-draft/

UN report promotes encryption as fundamental and protected right

A meeting of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression David Kaye is due to present his report on encryption there on June 17. (Reuters/Denis Balibouse)

On Wednesday, Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression David Kaye will present his report on international legal protection for encryption and anonymity to the United Nations Human Rights Council. The report is an important contribution to the security conversation at a time when some Western leaders are calling for ill-informed and impossible loopholes in technology--a trend that facilitates surveillance and tends to enable states that openly seek to repress journalists.

Ethiopia, which aggressively prosecuted a group known as the "Zone 9" bloggers for participating in email encryption training, is one such state. Authorities there jail more journalists than any other country in Africa, other than Eritrea, and it is the fourth most censored country in the world, according to CPJ research. The Ethiopian government is suspected of conducting widespread surveillance inside the county and of hacking the computers of journalists living overseas.

"In a country like Ethiopia where journalists are consistently watched, [we] need to protect their communications and their data to do reports on sensitive issues," Endalkachew H/Michael, one of the co-founders of Zone 9, told CPJ by email. "If a journalist cannot protect her communication with her sources, she cannot practice journalism."

Michael, who left Ethiopia to study for his doctorate in media studies at the University of Oregon, added: "I believe encryption is a lifeblood for freedom of expression."

In his report, Kaye urged states to promote strong encryption and anonymity through legislation and regulation. The report recommended eschewing restrictions on encryption and anonymity "which facilitate and often enable the rights to freedom of opinion and expression." Kaye said measures by states that weaken security online posed a "serious threat" to freedom of expression, and suggested that some common state practices and proposals were in violation of international law. The report described blanket measures such as encryption backdoors, weak encryption standards, and the holding of encryption keys inescrow as deeply problematic, and concluded that "measures that impose generally applicable restrictions on massive numbers of persons, without a case-by-case assessment," are almost certainly illegal.

In order to satisfy international proportionality principles, the report said, forced decryption by governments must be made on a case-by-case basis, constrained by law, and subject to judicial warrant.

The report went further, acknowledging that state regulation of encryption can be "tantamount to a ban[.]" It condemned the regulatory practices of countries including Pakistan, Cuba, and Ethiopia, noting that they interfered with the right of individuals to encrypt communication. The report supported anonymous and pseudonymous speech, and denounced rules that require users to identify themselves as a precondition to communication. Finally, it urged privately owned companies to refrain from blocking or limiting encrypted communication and topermit anonymous communication.

Why encryption by default is necessary

Kaye's recommendations get to the core of why encryption by default is so necessary. He has brushed aside technically impossible rhetoric and dismissed false legal narratives that serve to reinforce the power of states to censor, surveil and harass journalists.

Under international law, state action that restricts freedom of expression must meet an exacting legal test. First, any limitations must be provided for by law. Second, they must be imposed on legitimate grounds. Third, they must be necessary and proportionate. As enablers of the right to freedom of expression, any restrictions on encryption or anonymity must conform to the same standards, Kaye argues in his report. And that means restrictions on encryption or anonymity are especially likely to fail the third prong because "blanket prohibitions fail to be necessary and proportionate."

Like the right to freedom of expression, encryption and anonymity also enable individuals to form and hold opinions. Unlike freedom of expression the right to hold opinions is absolute--a key distinction Kaye identified as an independent but related basis for protecting privacy-enhancing tools.

Kaye told CPJ that technology was generating new threats to which existing legal principles must apply, adding, "How can a person develop opinions about the world without access to receive information, especially online?"

An attorney, Kaye is realistic about the limits of law for regulating government behavior. As he notes in his report, many states have explicit protection for journalist-source communication. Nonetheless, "States often breach source anonymity in practice, even where it is provided for in law." His report emphasized the need for journalists and others to have the freedom to protect themselves, an astute argument given the borderless nature of the Internet.

For Ali Nikouei, an Iranian blogger who said he was forced to flee, the need for protection is a stark reality. "A journalist [or] an activist who wants to, for example, organize a protest, who wants to have a connection with a news agency outside of Iran ... they have problems," Nikouei told CPJ at the Circumvention Tech Festival in Valencia, Spain, in March. Nikouei, who said he was arrested and held for three months in Iran in 2009, added: "The government is listening to their conversations. The government does everything it can."

Kaye's report gives further momentum to CPJ's vital work. We are engaged with the U.N., the American government, companies, and newsrooms to help make encryption by default a reality in 2015-- a shift that would protect journalists, sources, readers, and other end-users automatically. CPJ converted its site to HTTPs-only earlier this year, which helped us successfully advocate for security improvements at institutions such as Knight Media Lab at Northwestern University and investigative journalism nonprofit ProPublica. Additionally, CPJ will host a technology summit in San Francisco this week to press for the uniform adoption of security best practices in newsrooms.

The momentum for enhanced security is building. The Let's Encrypt project aims to provide free, automated, and open HTTPS certificates to the public within several months. On June 12, Wikipedia announced that its site would convert to HTTPS by default, a process in which the international blogging network Global Voices is also engaged, and which The New York Times is exploring. And, at the same time that it was pressuring Apple and other tech companies to build backdoors into their devices, the U.S. government announced on June 8 that it would move to HTTPS-only for all publicly accessible federal websites and Web services.

To Kaye, the link between press freedom and technology is clear. "[G]overnments are using a variety of technologies and approaches either for mass surveillance or for targeted attacks on and surveillance of activists, journalists, civil society organizations, and others, and some [governments] use technology to block access to information," Kaye told CPJ by email. "Individuals use tools like encryption and anonymizing platforms to protect themselves and their privacy or legitimately gain access to information."

He added: "Those tools need to be protected to allow exercise of fundamental rights to opinion and expression. Restricting these tools restricts exercise of the rights."

Kaye's report drew on submissions from states and civil society organizations -- including a joint letter submitted by CPJ and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which can be read here.

Source: https://www.cpj.